Expanding U.S. Tactical Aviation's "Approved Belief"

[Dan Moore]

We believe that Americans and her allies at the greatest risk of injury and death -- friendly troops, police, and firefighters engaged -- should enjoy the full benefits of decentralized, distributed aviation easily and systematically integrated at the platoon and police levels.

The "approved belief" for U.S. tactical fixed wing aviation can be expanded to include increasing numbers of aviators and fixed wing aircraft -- excluding short take off vertical land (STOVL) aircraft due to reliability and low altitude survivability issues -- capable of taking it to the enemy at low altitude and in cities.

Some headway was made in counter-insurgency (COIN) aircraft and operations and in the unmanned persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.

As a departure point, please consider the attached report, "Integrated Air-Ground Operations at the Platoon Level: An Operational Assessment of Rugged, Low-Cost, Fixed Wing Manned Aircraft." Also attached is a three page summary, "Building Snowmobiles" in Wadi Rum -- John Boyd's Legacy Continues."

While tactical and operational low altitude air-ground integration was shown to be increasingly effective during the U.S. Pacific Campaign of World War II, it was systematically excluded as an "approved belief" for U.S. tactical aviation from the Vietnam War forward.

Even a cursory review -- of the declining types and quantities of aviators, aircraft, and weapons capable of easily, quickly, and reliably integrating at the platoon level under austere conditions -- provides ample evidence of the long term consequences of excluding this significant tactical aviation capability.

From 1973 forward, the "approved belief" for U.S. tactical aviation was for air-ground integration at the three star level at a remote headquarters. This became joint doctrine and practice after the Gulf War in 1991. Increasing numbers of fixed-wing U.S. tactical aviators were indoctrinated into believing that it was a death sentence to fly below 3000 feet above ground level regardless of the demonstrated surface to air threat level.

From 1973 to 2006 this significantly reduced aviation's effectiveness because fixed wing tactical aviation was no longer allowed to contribute to operational and tactical initiative, maneuver and situation awareness.

Increasing numbers of aviators, troops, police, and fire fighters were increasingly locked into rigid and stove piped channels that inhibited fixed wing tactical air-ground integration on the battlefield as a matter of routine.

Air-ground unit cohesion at the platoon level with large numbers of fixed wing aviators was systematically eliminated and aviation's operational and tactical OODA loops were increasingly synchronized and aligned to higher headquarters leaving a number of recurring and predictable operational and tactical blind spots.

Our enemies have become increasingly effective at exploiting these blind spots. A member of this conference highlighted one of these blind spots when he introduced low cost/high numbers of swarming threats into the game.

God bless the many aviators and troops who on their own and at great personal (and professional) risk took it upon themselves to integrate at lower levels through a variety of on the spot innovations. While necessary, their initiative and personal bravery, were not sufficient to overcome the institutionalized exclusion of air-ground integration at the platoon, police, and fire fighter levels.

It may be easier to start outside the entrenched aviation defenses of the Pentagon by starting with domestic disaster relief operations -- San Francisco, Chicago, & New York and Southern California wild fires.

There are people signed on to 2008 Boyd conference who are more current and with broader access to current U.S. tactical aviation forces than I currently enjoy-- my last field experience being in Jordan in 2005. Hopefully they can report significant improvements in this area since 2005.

Cheers -- Dan Moore

Tucson, Arizona

[Michael Parkyn]

Don't know why you'd exclude STOVL. The only mishap data I've ever seen indicates STOVL loss rate is more a function of high task loading and single engine. In the low altitude combat environment, I submit current STOVL aircraft have the same loss rate as non-STOVL single engine strike aircraft. Do you have data to indicate otherwise?
Recommend you include all fixed wing tactical aircraft for a more holistic analysis.

[Dan Moore]

Michael -- I'll argue we should focus our efforts on correcting a more fundamental issue -- expanding the 'Approved Belief' as described above before considering particular equipment options and solutions.

For greater detail see, "Blindspots, Financial Panic of 2008, & Fractals" a November 26, 2008 reply to the discussion about the Evolution of Conflict and Chaos Theory on the 2008 Boyd Conference Website.

As to particulars -- short take off vertical land or 'STOVL' equipment options and solutions -- decades of test and field data suggest this is a fragile, expensive, high maintenance option tending to produce flying clubs rather than air forces in terms of total numbers of aircraft in the air instead of in expensive hangars under costly maintenance and repair, especially their engines -- a rather distorted looking beast with few teeth and huge logistical tail.

[Michael Parkyn]

A few questions to help the discussion progress:

1. Have you considered looking at STOVL reliability data from Afghanistan & Iraq? Extremely high availability. The Harrier is also at the end of its service life, and its replacement promises to exceed its reliability standards by a large margin. Boyd would advocate for periodic reorientation on any issue -- has this group done so by looking at recent empirical data?

2. have you looked at STOVL loss rates in Iraq & Afghanistan? 0 to date, while an EPAF F-16 resided at the end of Bagram's runway for some time after its pilot was unable to maintain control during landing. If I'm not mistaken, the F-16 was the exemplar of Boyd's theories.

3. Boyd was a rabid student of history. Are we? Was it not true that the very specialized nature of light observation aircraft made them excessively vulnerable even in the COIN role in Vietnam? What is the relevance of that historical episode?

4. P-4054 has impressive flight characteristics and capabilities -- at mean sea level. In the contested terrain of Afghanistan's mountain passes, it couldn't loiter on a windless VFR day -- forget about the challenges posed by temperature extremes, icing, and winds.

I'm inspired by the possibilities of the expanded belief. However, the possibility will never be realized if its proponents are, like Boyd's Pentagon adversaries -- only willing to cling to some of the facts.

[Dan Moore]

December 5, 2008

Irregular Wars and Expanding the ‘Approved Belief’ for U.S. Tactical Air Forces

Two noteworthy news items:

++Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates’s “Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming The Pentagon for a New Age” in the January 2009 Issue of Foreign Affairs.

++Bruce Rolfsen’s “Air Force Want New, Cheap Aircraft for Irregular Wars” in the December 8, 2008 Issue of the Air Force Times.

In the first paragraph copied below, SECDEF highlights how “The Foe is Inside the U.S. Acquisition Cycle,” as posted in October on the 2008 Boyd Conference Website. In the second paragraph copied below he argues for “Expanding U.S. Tactical Aviation’s ‘Approved Belief ‘ as posted in July on the 2008 Boyd Conference Website.

BEGIN SECDEF QUOTE

The Department of Defense's conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The challenge is whether these two different paradigms can be made to coexist in the U.S. military's mindset and bureaucracy.

The Defense Department has to consider whether in situations in which the United States has total air dominance, it makes sense to employ lower-cost, lower-tech aircraft that can be employed in large quantities and used by U.S. partners. This is already happening now in the field with Task Force ODIN in Iraq, which has mated advanced sensors with turboprop aircraft to produce a massive increase in the amount of surveillance and reconnaissance coverage. The issue then becomes how to build this kind of innovative thinking and flexibility into the rigid procurement processes at home. The key is to make sure that the strategy and risk assessment drive the procurement, rather than the other way around.

END SECDEF QUOTE

Bruce Rolfsen’s article “Air Force wants new, cheap aircraft for irregular wars” provides evidence suggesting that the U.S. Air Force may be expanding its approved belief to include relatively cheap and rugged aircraft costing millions of dollars and available in months and years rather than costing billions of dollars and available in decades.

BEGIN QUOTE

Air Force pilots have not flown propeller driven fighters in combat since the Vietnam War, but that could soon change.

Air Combat Command is outlining requirements for a fighter intended for irregular warfare battles where the speed of an F 16 Fighting Falcon or the armor of an A-10 Thunderbolt is not essential. The small air-to-ground fighter — dubbed the OA-X — should cost no more than $10 million and use an airframe, engine and avionics already available, according to Lt. Col. Mike Saridakis, chief of the close-air attack branch at ACC’s Joint Air/Ground Combat Division.

As part of an Air Force-wide review of missions directed by new Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz, Air Combat Command is looking at what is needed for irregular wars against an elusive enemy that fights in small units….

At $10 million a plane, the Air Force could equip a 24-aircraft OA X squadron for less than the cost of two F-22As….

So far, the requirements call for the OA X to carry at least two 500-pound guided bombs, a pair of air-to-ground missiles such as Hellfires and a machine gun. The outline doesn’t specify the size or location of the gun. “We really don’t care as long as it is accurate,” Saridakis said.

The plane’s unrefueled flying time should be five to six hours, Saridakis said….

About half the $10 million price tag would be spent to buy the basic aircraft, Saridakis calculated. The service would spend another $4 to $5 million equipping it with avionics, communications and other gear.

The Air Force spends about $7,750 an hour to keep an F-16 airborne while a light attack fighter should cost about $1,000 an hour, Saridakis said.

END QUOTE

Dan Moore
Tucson, Arizona

[Michael Parkyn]

All excellent ideas, to include the glacial nature of acquisition in DoD. At the same time, we needlessly relearn some lessons again and again.

The reason why propellor-driven aircraft were driven from the battlefield in Vietnam is, among other things, economic. It took less money to develop and field missile and gun systems capable of taking such an aircraft down than it took to field the aircraft. These systems cost $0.00 an hour to keep operational.

That is even more true today. While we might think we can buy viable Commercial Off The Shelf decoy technology, we forget that the manufacturers of surface-to-air missiles haven't been asleep for the past three decades. The things they make today are a fraction of the cost and many times more capable than their Cold War ancestors. Before we will be capable of making a few dozen light aircraft, a much poorer enemy will have been able to reequip with the appropriate (and cheaper) counter to our technology.

When we fault DoD for a slow acquisition cycle, perhaps we should give ourselved a properly complex (wicked?) problem to solve. Instead of forming a mental model of DoD that is staffed by mindless bureacrats and concluding with a clap of our hands that the problem is the bureaucrat staff, let's be real. Let's assume DoD is staffed by imaginative professionals, perhaps even equal to the likes of this august group. If they're so smart, why can't they organize, train and equip properly for war?

Could size be a factor? Are we possibly blaming the leviathan for being big? Given the diverse nature of DoD's tasking, the vast number of missions it fulfills, and the amount of resources it stewards, I submit it will always need to be a big organization and will never be capable of great agility on a large scale.

I submit that the magic is not in a smarter person or a smarter approved belief, it's in a smaller organization. From the looks of the article, that's what ACC is making inside of itself.

If the discussion goes on to posit a "company commander's" air element, think again. The key to distibuted aviation operations isn't a cooler airplane, it's boring old logistics. We might imagine up a great little airplane to dole out to the infantrymen, but how do we supply the multitudes of maintainers who must be in many places at once now that we've distributed? How do we get all of those fuel trucks into country and keep them safe on the roads to the aircraft hide sites? How do we get armorers and SATS loaders and all the other things we need, in the numbers we need? When you look at the mountain of things it takes to make an aircraft fly, you will start grouping the planes together.

When you do that, you'll need to move the planes quickly from place to place and to generate sufficient numbers of sorties to move bombs in 1000lb increments when the small wars get hot, and they'll need to be pretty adaptable to handle all the missions taking place in all those square miles of battlespace.

In the end, I bet you'll see a concept that is double the gross weight, and triple- to quadruple the price in full operational capability than was predicted. I think it's not going to be any smaller or slower than an A-10.

[Lynn Wheeler]

Boyd's briefings in the 80s ... strongly suggested he had a hand in F20/tigershark as the "F16" for the 80s/90s (much cheaper, much easier to maintain, lower skill level to maintain, fewer hrs maintenance per flt hrs, etc) ... although I don't remember John actually saying F20 or tigershark ... he did make reference to visits to Northrup. All the articles from the period seemed to indicate that F20 fell pray to lobbying and US subsidies to foreign govs. explicitly for F16 purchases. wiki page
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-20_Tigershark

[Dan Moore]

From: Dan Moore
Date: 31 January 2009 11:43:45 GMT-07:00
To: USMC CAPT X
Cc: 7 Other Resources
Subject: PROJECT LIBERTY ASSESSMENT & A RESPONSE TO YOUR EMAIL OF 28 JANUARY

Captain X:

Glad you found this information useful. This email has three purposes:

1. To make you aware of "Project Liberty" including an initial assessment of the selected aircraft option.
2. To provide, in addition to Resouces 1 and 2, additional folks for your research -- Resources 3 through 7.
3. To respond, IN CAPS, to particular questions in your email copied immediately below the signature line.

BEGIN PROJECT LIBERTY ARTICLE

Source: Airforce-magizine.com

Project Liberty Heads Downrange
—Marc V. Schanz

Jan. 28, 2009—This coming April, the first of the Air Force’s new MC-12W intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance aircraft will deploy to the war theater. These platforms, dubbed Liberty Project Aircraft, will augment the heavily tasked overhead ISR assets employed by the US military and its coalition partners in Afghanistan and Iraq, in particular USAF’s MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles.

The MC-12Ws will contribute to the fight by passing valuable full-motion video and signals intelligence data in real-time down to the ground troops at the tactical level who need them most.

Fielding the aircraft by then is “remarkable,” considering the LPA project is only a year old, Brig. Gen. Blair E. Hansen, director of ISR capabilities on the Air Staff, said during a Jan. 23 meeting with reporters in the Pentagon.

The genesis for LPA came last April when the Office of the Secretary of Defense task force sought a quick means to address the seemingly insatiable demand for ISR capability in Southwest Asia. Virtually all MQ-1s and MQ-9s deploy to the fight as soon as they arrive from the factory, yet the demand keeps growing.

“That curve is as steep as it can get right now,” said Hansen of the Air Force’s UAV efforts in theater. Currently there are 33 combat air patrols of MQ-1 and MQ-9s flying in Southwest Asia.

After weighing concepts, Defense Secretary Robert Gates last July signed an order for the Air Force to proceed with its proscribed solution: procurement of 37 specially configured C-12 twin-engine aircraft based on the Beechcraft King Air 350. Thus was born “Project Liberty,” named after the World War II effort to quickly press commercial ships into the fight in Europe.

“The concept was, ‘What can we do in an additive fashion that would get extra capability?” said Hansen. The need was simple: FMV and Sigint in a multi-sensor package. And, getting it to the war zone soon.

The first seven MC-12Ws will be modified, used King Air 350s. The remaining 30 will be based on the King Air 350 Extended Range model. These lightweight airframes will carry a small logistics footprint and be contractor maintained. The ER variant will offer an extra hour-and-half of flight time on top of the six hours of flight time that the basic King Air 350 version has. They will feature signals intelligence, electro-optical and infrared sensors, data links to ground forces, a state-of-the-art countermeasures system, and a blue-force tracker.

The first seven aircraft will feature a laser pointer. The remainder will carry a laser designator with a more accurate, narrower beam than on the pointer. The designator feature will “greatly” facilitate operations, said Hansen.

LPA aircrews (two pilots and two sensor operators) will be able to talk directly to troops on the ground, just as Predator and Reaper operators do today, Hansen said. In addition to utilizing tools such as the remote operational video enhanced receiver to send intelligence to them, the crews will shoot information back to small ground-site locations throughout the theater where approximately 100 deployed airmen will be actively analyzing, disseminating, and processing it as part of the expeditionary air support operations group.

“Heretofore, intelligence was largely centered at high levels,” Hansen said. He added, “Now we have the ability to flatten it. We’ve made it immediately consumable ... and this system is one of those systems pumping information into that picture.”

In the gestation period of the LPA project, conventional and special operations forces were essential to designing the capability, Hansen said. While the Army is pursing a similar capability under its Task Force ODIN, there is no “stove pipe” between them. Instead, there is a common architecture in place in theater to process and exploit information, he said.

Initial training on the LPA will be done by contractors at various locations, followed by weapons system training by the Mississippi Air National Guard in Meridian, Miss. For two years, the Air Guard will run training until the Air Force establishes a “long-term capability,” Hansen said. All pilots will go to commercial training, then follow with mission qualification training for combat missions.

The Air Force has secured all but about $100 million of the $950 million required to fund the acquisition of 37 of the aircraft. The remaining funds are anticipated this summer as part of the next war supplemental spending package.

Hansen said the LPA effort is tied “indirectly in concept” to development of the Iraqi Air Force, including its own King Air fleet which recently began flying similar missions in theater with the help of USAF advisors. The LPA features similar capabilities, but the architecture is quite different and far more robust, he noted.

END PROJECT LIBERTY ARTICLE

BEGIN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT LIBERTY'S MC-12W AIRCRAFT OPTION

There are direct links between the 2005 combined-arms experiments in Jordan and the Liberty Project, a second quarter 2009 (2Q09) USAF deployment of modified Beechaircraft King Air 350's (MC-12W).

The Jordan/SEEKER aircraft option was reportedly sidelined during a 4Q06 business meetings in Wichita, KA.

This assessment begins with the following belief:

"We believe that Americans and her allies at the greatest risk of injury and death -- friendly troops, police, and firefighters engaged -- should enjoy the full benefits of decentralized, distributed aviation easily and systematically integrated at the platoon and police levels.

The "approved belief" for U.S. tactical fixed wing aviation can be expanded to include increasing numbers of aviators and fixed wing aircraft -- excluding short take off vertical land (STOVL) aircraft due to reliability and low altitude survivability issues -- capable of taking it to the enemy at low altitude and in cities."

More: http://boyd2008.ning.com/forum/topics/2171602:Topic:413

(From the 2008 Boyd Conference Forum discussion, "Expanding U.S. Aviation's "Approved Belief:")

We welcome "Project Liberty" because it may eventually demonstrate a permanent expansion of the "approved belief" for the U.S. Air Force.

Unfortunately, the MC-12W aircraft option for Project Liberty is constrained when compared to a Jordan/Seeker aircraft option perhaps representing an option that takes one step forward, two steps backward:

** It appears U.S. centric rather than an option that's regionally embedded and of immediate diplomatic, financial and military benefit to the U.S. and her allies in Jordan and Iraq.

** Does not appear to affordably produce hundreds, perhaps thousands, of aircraft organically integrated at the platoon and police levels by deploying 37 aircraft at an estimated $25.67M per aircraft ($950M/37 aircraft). The same level of funding assuming a SEEKER aircraft price of $2M could produce 475 aircraft capable and suitable for rapid integration at the platoon and police levels.

** Does not appear to offer organic air-ground integration at the platoon and police levels. (For additional discussion please see the excerpt from the 2005 Institute of Defense Analyses report below).

** Does not appear to provide a bottom up and top down option that lends itself to rapid scaling -- up and down against a fourth generation foe-- (see ISOCAF sketch at the bottom of this email).

** It may be possible to view the MC-12W option as an intermediate step -- integrated at the battalion or brigade levels -- with a phase II regional plan designed to produce hundreds of affordable SEEKER like aircraft organically integrated into U.S. and Allied platoon and police units.

END INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT LIBERTY'S MC-12W AIRCRAFT OPTION

BEGIN ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR YOUR RESEARCH

RESOURCE 3 was part of the 2005 experiments in Jordan and is a member of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program as is RESOURCE 4 (cc'd above).

RESOURCE 5 is a retired army officer who has argued for "bringing back the Cessnas."

RESOURCE 6 and RESOURCE 7 are two of the Navy's best minds about the sciences of complexity and 21st century conflict.

END ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR YOUR RESEARCH

V/r & S/f -- Dan
============================

.On 28 Jan 2009 , at 14:45, USMC CAPTAIN X wrote:

Sir,
It was great talking to you. Thank you very much for the treasure
trove of information. Due to a snow day, I have finally just had time to
download the documents and especially read the Jaeger Air report. The Jaeger
Air report was very interesting and gave me some great ideas. It was done
almost 15 years ago and in its stymied efforts, accurately predicted the
(wrong) direction in which air support has gone and continues to go. I look
forward to reading the rest of the documents as well.

I have also been thinking about your Seekers. As a former
homesteader in Yuma, AZ, the Seeker program sounds like something that the
Border Patrol would be very interested in as a much more practical (and far
less expensive) alternative to UASs. With the additional benefit of not
requiring restricted airspace and the ability to see and avoid. The type of
exercises evaluated in the test bed almost perfectly describe Border Patrol
operations. The operating (and threat) environment is almost exactly the
same. After all, in any other country the Border Patrol would really be
looked at as part of our defense forces fighting a 4th generation war.

SOME ARE ARGUING THE NEXT MAJOR ATTACK/LOSS OF LIFE ON U.S. SOIL WILL COME NOT COME FROM THE MIDDLE EAST BUT FROM A FAILED OR FAILING MEXICAN NATION STATE DO TO THE INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NARCO-TRAFFICERS TO KILL AND DISRUPT AND CORRUPT MEXICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

YESTERDAY THE TUCSON MORNING PAPER HEADLINED, "BORDER FENCE AVERAGED $3.9 MILLION PER MILE," for a total of 140 miles (for a total of $546M).

more http://www.azstarnet.com/allheadlines/278112.php

A $100M SEEKER AIRCRAFT LIKE OPTION COULD HAVE PRODUCED 10 AIRCRAFT FOR $20M; $10M FOR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE AND THE REMAINING $70M AVAILABLE FOR LOCAL/COUNTY/STATE/FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT.


You also mentioned that you were thinking about what the right size
the organic observation unit would be per friendly echelon size. I submit
that the size of the organic observation unit would be based on the
disposition of the enemy.

CONCUR - BY STARTING WITH AN IRREDUCIBLE SELF-ORGANIZING COMBINED ARMS FORCE (PLATOON OR POLICE UNIT WITH 2 TO 3 SEEKER AIRCRAFT) YOU CAN MEET THE LOWEST POSSIBLE THREAT LEVELS (CRIMINAL AND MILITARY) AND THEN THE UNITS AND RAPIDLY SCALE BASED ON PARTICULAR SITUATIONS.

The task force would take along the size it needed
based on what it wanted to do with it. Essentially, this would be determined
by the number of Named Areas of Interest, or else maneuvering elements (both
fr and en) and the Seekers coverage ability to match.

Do I understand that Resource 1 is the expert on aircraft
survivability? The Jaeger Report alludes to documents or briefs that were
given at the seminars. Are there any sources I could tap into for this
information?

Resource 1 IS AN EXPERT ON MANY THINGS -- RECOMMEND CONTACTING HIM DIRECTLY ABOUT SURVIVABILITY AS WELL AS MANY OF THE DOCUMENTS BEHIND THE PREVIOUSLY SENT 1994 REPORT BY THE COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR FORCES PACIFIC.

Resource 2 IS ALSO A GREAT RESOURCE ON SUPPRESSING THE SOUND OF PROPELLER DRIVEN AIRCRAFT -- A VERSION OF AFFORDABLE AND SUSTAINABLE STEALTH.


You may be interested to know that the Advanced Warfighting Seminar
will be hosting Migs next week to discuss Air Cooperation in Maneuver
Warfare. It should be a great discussion.

WILL CALL MIGS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS -- GLAD TO SEE THE MARINE CORPS APPRECIATES HIS VALUE.



Thanks again for fountain of knowledge,

MUCH OF WHAT'S IN THE FOUNTAIN IS COURTESY OF CHUCK MYERS AND LES HORN.

USMC CAPTAIN X

====================================

-----Original Message-----
From: Dan Moore [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 22:20
To: CAPT X
Cc: OTHER RESOURCES
Subject: Evolution of Conflict, Air-Ground Cooperation, & The Emerging
Threat

Captain X --

Great chatting with you this weekend, please call as questions arise. The
documents we discussed are available via the following link:

http://public.me.com/dan.moore

You should see a folder titled "Evolution of Conflict Air-Ground Cooperation
The Emerging Threat"

Download the entire folder. You should find 11 documents -- detailed below
the signature line. Two of them are by John Robb -- USAF academy grad,
special forces pilot, recent graduate of Yale public policy and now an
"entrepreneur,"

his website:


http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/

I've also Cc'd:

RESOURCE 1: Low Altitude (< 50 ft AGL) B-25's in WWII for the USAF and
F-4U's for the USN, Former OSD, Director, Air Warfare

RESOURCE 2 -- He can tell you about "stealth" CAS and has insights about
trying to get the Armed Services and Congress to do the right thing.

Happy Hunting & S/f -- Dan



BEGIN DOCUMENT LIST

1967 "McNamara Kills the Pilatus Porter" with Commentary by Pierre Sprey

1994 "Report on an Operational Examination of Carrier Based Aerial Fire
Support for Troops Engaged" -- CNAP/RESOURCE 1

1999 "Capable Warrior Limited Objective Experiment Three, Experiment Report"
-- MCWL

2003 "Patton's Air Force and Beyond: Lessons in Air-Ground Cooperation" GEN
Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center

2003 "Sources by War" (Needs updating esp. with H. John Poole's books & John
Robb's works)

2005 A "John Boyd Story" for the Erie County Historical Society

2005 Letter from Major General Jim Molan of the Australian Defence Force

2005 "The Open-Source War" by John Robb

2005 "Integrated Air-Ground Operations at the Platoon Level: An Operational
Assessment using Rugged, Low-Cost, Fixed-Wing, Manned Aircraft." --
Institute for Defense Analyses -- Pay particular interest to "Locus of
Control" and Figure 1 "System Quantities vs. Cost and their Locus of
Control" (pp. 1-3)

2007 "The Coming Urban Terror" by John Robb

2008 "Irregular Wars and Expanding the 'Approved Belief' for U.S. Tactical
Air Forces" by Dan Moore

END DOCUMENT LIST

==============================================
BEGIN EXCERPT FROM 2005 Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA) REPORT
I. Introduction

Coalition military and police units in Iraq continue to sustain significant casualties from ambush and other movements to contact. This is, in part, because small-unit commanders—e.g., commanders of civilian police squads or of military platoons or squads—often conduct operations without the ability to observe and orient beyond natural and man-made obstructions to ground level observations. Ambushes—either manned or by improvised explosive devices—are common and have proven effective against coalition ground units. The enemy also has evolved a variety of methods for effectively disrupting coalition units as they try to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure: borders, pipelines, roads, and power lines.

Elevating a small-unit commander’s line-of-sight above ground level greatly increases situation awareness and enables a variety of imaginative solutions to an emerging tactical situation. Unmanned aerial vehicles provide glimpses “over the hill” and “around the bend,” but these systems are neither flexible nor adaptive and require large amounts of infrastructure and mission planning. Conventional manned military aviation (fixed-wing and rotary-wing) could provide the needed coverage; however, their high cost, low numbers, and high maintenance requirements prohibit continuous overhead presence in support of small-unit commanders. Furthermore, the capacities of the command and control hierarchy for conventional military aircraft are often exceeded when attempting to provide services to the lower levels, resulting in no overhead presence at all for small-unit commanders.

Locus of Control

Military capabilities can be controlled at multiple levels in the military command hierarchy. In general, the most potent assets are the most expensive and can be acquired only in the fewest numbers. Their scarcity and potency make their sitting idle unacceptable during war.

For example, Allied airpower in the World War II North Africa campaign was apportioned to numerous army corps, so large numbers of aircraft sat idle when their corps were not engaged with the enemy. Since then, the U.S. Air Force has argued that all aircraft should be under centralized command at the theater level.

At the other end of the spectrum are the indispensable weapons of infantry—rifles, mortars, and machine guns. They are inexpensive, can be purchased in large numbers, and are distributed across the force. Unlike supersonic aircraft, small arms are ubiquitous, and it is quite natural that they sit idle much of the time. Their advantage is that they are available whenever needed without the delays associated with ponderous command and control procedures.

Between the fighter jet and the rifle lies artillery. For a variety of reasons—including cost, numbers, and range—the U.S. Army commands artillery at the division level.

As already stated, the higher the cost, the fewer the numbers, and the greater the need to push the locus of control of the weapon further up the military command hierarchy (see Figure 1). Another implication, and a very important one, is that command and control at the higher echelons is accomplished by expensive and complex systems and ponderous procedures that are responsive only to the higher echelon commander.

Figure 1. System Quantities vs. Cost and their Locus of Control

An unintended and undesirable consequence of increasingly expensive and complex aircraft is the inability to form integrated air-ground teams at the small-unit command level. These are the echelons that take the heaviest casualties while conducting patrol and convoy escort operations. Only an inexpensive aircraft that can be purchased in large numbers can be dedicated to these echelons.

Integrated Air-Ground Concept of Operations

One solution to this problem is an integrated air-ground concept of operations that integrates rugged, low-cost, highly reliable, manned air assets tailored to the emergent needs of small-unit commanders—those commanders responsible for convoys and for border and ground patrols. For overhead presence and support to be most effective, it should be continuous and immediately responsive to the commander’s needs during times of uncertainty. The overhead component must be able to adapt spontaneously to ever-changing conditions and tactical situations. For an air asset to meet a small-unit commander’s needs, the following properties are highly desirable.

· Low-cost (available in large numbers)

· Long endurance

· Extreme ruggedness and reliability

· Independent of special support equipment

· Above all, under the commander’s direct control.


SOURCE: "Integrated Air-Ground Operations at the Platoon Level: An Operational Assessment using Rugged, Low-Cost, Fixed-Wing, Manned Aircraft," IDA Paper P-4054, Log H05-001629/1.

END EXCERPT FROM 2005 IDA REPORT



=======================





BEGIN SKETCH OF AN IRREDUCIBLE SELF-ORGANIZING COMBINED ARMS FORCE

CMOC = "Civil Military Operation Center" per Col James A. "Al" Pace, USMC in Marine Corps Gazette June 2005 pp 10-13



END SKETCH OF AN IRREDUCIBLE SELF-ORGANIZING COMBINED ARMS FORCE

[Weight Lifting for Beginners]

Tactical Air Command (TAC) is an inactive United States Air Force organization. It was a Major Command of the United States Air Force, established on March 21, 1946 being headquartered at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. It was inactivated on June 1, 1992 and its personnel and equipment were absorbed by Air Combat Command. Weight lifting for beginners program is but it is demanding, when you start a you need to have one thing straight, this is not going to be a walk on the park, this is nothing easy, nor these are vacation, in a weight lifting for beginners program.

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[Ann]

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[Rebeca henderson]

Tactical Air Command was established to provide a balance between strategic, air defense, and tactical forces of the post-World War II Air Force. In 1948 the Continental Air Command assumed control over air defense, tactical air, and air reserve forces. After two years in a subordinate role, Tactical Air Command (TAC) was reestablished as a major command.

In 1992, after assessing the mission of TAC and to accommodate the decision made regarding Strategic Air Command, HQ United States Air Force inactivated TAC and incorporated its resources into the newly created Air Combat Command. Credito