Applying Boyd to the Pressing Problems of our Time
The Vulture and The Snake: An Air Force Counter-Guerrilla Task Force
Originally posted on November 14, 2008
Please find copied below the signature a link and extended excerpt from a paper that, in my view, is one of the more thoughtful, useful and relevant discussions and analyses in "Expanding U.S. Tactical Aviation's "Approved Belief" -- per the "Discussion" Section of the Boyd Conference 2008 website.
On slide 108 of his "Patterns of Conflict" briefing, Boyd laid out general observations regarding a "Counter-Guerilla Campaign."
The "Vulture and the Snake" essay, without attribution to Boyd, provides useful insights in the practical application of Boyd's ideas.
In other news, the following headline appeared this week, that the U.S. Air Force requirements folks (ACC) were considering an expansion to their "Approved Belief" regarding aviation:
"ACC officials want Air Force irregular warfare fleet of aircraft"
BY: MARCUS WEISGERBER , INSIDE THE AIR FORCE
11/13/2
Start your watches, watch your wallets, and for those of you on the ground in the field -- keep your heads down.
We've got a ring side seat. Is this headline and article:
a. a head fake?
b. business as usual -- billions of dollars taking decades to field a fragile, highest possible cost capability, gold-plated monstrosity, that spends most of its time in repair instead of in the air?
c. evidence that U.S. Air Force officials are serious about expanding their "Approved Belief" to include "that Americans and her allies at the greatest risk of injury and death -- friendly troops, police, and firefighters engaged -- should enjoy the full benefits of decentralized, distributed aviation easily and systematically integrated at the platoon and police levels?"
Dan Moore
Tucson, Arizona
This link will take you to the full essay excerpted below:
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/39pub.html
2.5 Attributes of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare
A regime or government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Generally, governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. This is also the tactical and operational goal of the guerrilla movement, so there is a great deal of correspondence between the goals of the two contenders. Thus, the characterization of the counter-guerrilla struggle should be carried out in parallel with the delineation of the guerrilla movement's weaknesses.
The principal goals of a war against guerrillas is the preservation of the regime, of the population's normal course of life, and the removal of the strategic threat which the guerrilla movement constitutes. Governments generally recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement entirely as an operative goal, and are satisfied with attrition of the guerrilla movement, especially as reducing its hostile activity to a tolerable level. Winning a counter-guerrilla campaign requires investments in weapon systems, manpower, organization and innovative doctrine: " Guerrilla warfare is decisive only where the anti-guerrilla side puts a low value on defeating the guerrillas and does not commit its full resources to the struggle."29
Military activity against the guerrilla movement includes policing activities, border patrols and guard duty, covert operations, counter-terror, and intelligence. It also involves political, economic, social, or diplomatic activities. Guerrilla warfare develops in parallel with the guerrilla movement in the areas of strategy, tactics, diplomacy, media, and so on, including cooperation with neighboring and friendly states. Those fighting guerrilla movements understand the importance of the media in the battle for public opinion, but for the most part have yet to deal properly with this issue. Counter-guerrilla forces are improving by adapting new weapon systems, but they still do not direct sufficient technological efforts to research and development (R&D).
Guerrilla groups become more professional over the course of the conflict until they sometimes are on a higher quality level than the regular army units fighting them. For example, the Hizballah forces in Lebanon, who display a high level of field skills and expertise in operating mortars, rockets, ground-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering devices.30 A modern distinction of the asymmetries between regular and irregular warfare was formulated by Gotowicki31:
Please find copied below the signature a link and extended excerpt from a paper that, in my view, is one of the more thoughtful, useful and relevant discussions and analyses in "Expanding U.S. Tactical Aviation's "Approved Belief" -- per the "Discussion" Section of the Boyd Conference 2008 website.
On slide 108 of his "Patterns of Conflict" briefing, Boyd laid out general observations regarding a "Counter-Guerilla Campaign."
The "Vulture and the Snake" essay, without attribution to Boyd, provides useful insights in the practical application of Boyd's ideas.
In other news, the following headline appeared this week, that the U.S. Air Force requirements folks (ACC) were considering an expansion to their "Approved Belief" regarding aviation:
"ACC officials want Air Force irregular warfare fleet of aircraft"
BY: MARCUS WEISGERBER , INSIDE THE AIR FORCE
11/13/2
Start your watches, watch your wallets, and for those of you on the ground in the field -- keep your heads down.
We've got a ring side seat. Is this headline and article:
a. a head fake?
b. business as usual -- billions of dollars taking decades to field a fragile, highest possible cost capability, gold-plated monstrosity, that spends most of its time in repair instead of in the air?
c. evidence that U.S. Air Force officials are serious about expanding their "Approved Belief" to include "that Americans and her allies at the greatest risk of injury and death -- friendly troops, police, and firefighters engaged -- should enjoy the full benefits of decentralized, distributed aviation easily and systematically integrated at the platoon and police levels?"
Dan Moore
Tucson, Arizona
This link will take you to the full essay excerpted below:
http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/39pub.html
2.5 Attributes of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare
A regime or government struggling against a guerrilla movement is on its defense, from the strategic point of view. On the operational and tactical level, the struggle has defensive and offensive facets. Generally, governments recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement and make do with wearing it down and minimizing its own attrition. This is also the tactical and operational goal of the guerrilla movement, so there is a great deal of correspondence between the goals of the two contenders. Thus, the characterization of the counter-guerrilla struggle should be carried out in parallel with the delineation of the guerrilla movement's weaknesses.
The principal goals of a war against guerrillas is the preservation of the regime, of the population's normal course of life, and the removal of the strategic threat which the guerrilla movement constitutes. Governments generally recognize their inability to destroy the guerrilla movement entirely as an operative goal, and are satisfied with attrition of the guerrilla movement, especially as reducing its hostile activity to a tolerable level. Winning a counter-guerrilla campaign requires investments in weapon systems, manpower, organization and innovative doctrine: " Guerrilla warfare is decisive only where the anti-guerrilla side puts a low value on defeating the guerrillas and does not commit its full resources to the struggle."29
Military activity against the guerrilla movement includes policing activities, border patrols and guard duty, covert operations, counter-terror, and intelligence. It also involves political, economic, social, or diplomatic activities. Guerrilla warfare develops in parallel with the guerrilla movement in the areas of strategy, tactics, diplomacy, media, and so on, including cooperation with neighboring and friendly states. Those fighting guerrilla movements understand the importance of the media in the battle for public opinion, but for the most part have yet to deal properly with this issue. Counter-guerrilla forces are improving by adapting new weapon systems, but they still do not direct sufficient technological efforts to research and development (R&D).
Guerrilla groups become more professional over the course of the conflict until they sometimes are on a higher quality level than the regular army units fighting them. For example, the Hizballah forces in Lebanon, who display a high level of field skills and expertise in operating mortars, rockets, ground-to-air missiles and intelligence gathering devices.30 A modern distinction of the asymmetries between regular and irregular warfare was formulated by Gotowicki31:
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